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Abstract
FDI introduces competition between foreign and domestic ﬁrms at the factor market level. If the latter
are technology backward, cost pressures render them uncompetitive, and absolute advantage determine
the pattern of foreign and domestic ﬁrms’ production. To compensate for technology deﬁciencies,
countries introduce distortions in product and factor markets. Trade liberalization, i.e., the removal
of these distortions, have important implications for production and employment patterns, wages and
capital ﬂows. I provide evidence that China’s policies to protect domestic −specially state-owned− ﬁrms
match the model’s prediction on the structure of interventions.
Key Words: Trade Integration, Tariﬀs, Capital Subsidies, FDI, Technology Transfers, China.
JEL: F1, F2.
∗I am grateful to Laura Alfaro, Edgardo Barandiarán, Janet Currie, Sebastian Edwards, Simon Evenett, Arnold Harberger,
William Hutchinson, Alexander Monge-Naranjo and specially Edward Leamer for comments, suggestions and criticisms. I have
also beneﬁted from comments at several seminar presentations. All errors are mine.
†Instituto de Economia, Universidad Catolica de Chile, Casilla 76, Correo 17, Santiago - Chile. Phone (56 2) 354 4325 Fax
(56 2) 553 2377.(sclaro@faceapuc.cl)
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Trade liberalization studies usually emphasize the eﬀects of tariﬀ changes in factor returns and in the
reallocation of resources across sectors. This horizontal view ignores that in many cases tariﬀ liberalization
is accompanied by the liberalization of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The opening access of domestic
markets to foreign producers introduce competition in factor markets, aﬀecting the competitive position of
technology-backward ﬁrms. If competition between technology-backward domestic ﬁrms and technology-
advanced foreign ﬁrms were only in product markets, technology diﬀerences would be compensated with
international factor price diﬀerences. However, this compensating mechanism vanishes if foreign ﬁrms
are allowed to produce domestically. Competition in factor markets render technology-backward ﬁrms
uncompetitive, as factors get employed in high-return ﬁrms. As a consequence, FDI liberalization generates
a movement of resources across ﬁrms within sectors — vertical movement — that may dominate the resource
allocation and factor return eﬀects of pure tariﬀ liberalization.
The experience of Germany in the 1990s highlights the relevance of these eﬀects. Integration of eastern
and western Germany in product and factor markets generated signiﬁcant cost pressures to technology-
backward eastern producers. The dramatic fall in industrial output and the rise in unemployment revealed
that the cost pressures for eastern ﬁrms were dramatic (Sinn, 1995). Although wage increases were far
beyond market-clearing levels due to unions pressures, there exists consensus that technology diﬀerences
between eastern and western producers, the fall of the communist block that provided an artiﬁcially high
demand for eastern products, and integration of capital markets were the main determinants of the price-
cost squeeze faced by eastern producers1. To sustain eastern employment and investment, the newly uniﬁed
government granted important capital subsidies to eastern ﬁrms (Sinn, 1995, 2002). Another example of the
implications for domestic ﬁrms of technology-advanced foreign competition is the case of China, specially
in the 1990s. Foreign ﬁrms have introduced important cost pressures to domestic producers −specially
1See Akerlof et.al., (1991), Dornbusch and Wolf (1994), Fitzroy and Funke (1998). For evidence on technology diﬀerences
between eastern and western producers at the moment of uniﬁcation and afterwards see Akerlof et.al., (1991) and Funke and
Jahn (2002).
2state-owned enterprises−, which share in output and employment have decreased steadily in the last two
decades 2 As I will argue bellow, the limits to foreign producers to access tariﬀ-protected domestic markets
together with a very restricted and controlled domestic capital market, have been the main mechanisms to
compensate for the technology-backwardness of domestic producers.
In a more global context, the implications for the pattern of world production and trade of product and
factor market integration in the presence of international technology diﬀerences are very broad. Indeed,
factor markets’ integration introduce cost pressures to ﬁrms on low-technology countries that render them
uncompetitive. As a consequence, absolute advantage arises as the relevant concept in international special-
ization (Storper, 1992). Of course, as long as some factors remain internationally immobile, there is always
scope for production of technology-backward ﬁrms. However, acknowledging the role that absolute technol-
ogy diﬀerences play in a world of increasing integration in factor markets is fundamental to understand the
policies that countries take in order to compensate for the cost pressures that globalization carries with.
The ﬁrst objective of the paper is to develop a model to understand the impact on technology-backward
domestic ﬁrms of tariﬀ and FDI liberalizations. For that, I assume that in the pre-integration situation,
coexistence of technology-backward domestic producers and technology-advanced foreign ﬁr m si ss u p p o r t e d
by distortions in product and factor markets that compensate for the technology gap. At the product
market level, only domestic ﬁrms can sell their products in tariﬀ-protected domestic markets. This distor-
tion is aimed to capture any policy that introduces a product-price advantage for domestic ﬁrms vis-à-vis
foreign producers. The model does not explicitly analyze the determinants of foreign investment, but these
assumptions imply that FDI is driven by international factor-price diﬀerences −determined by international
technology diﬀerences−, rather than by tariﬀ-jumping justiﬁcation. In other words, foreign aﬃliate produc-
tion is not intended for the local market, at least until FDI is liberalized.3
At the factor market level, I assume that the domestic capital market is segmented from international
2See Branstteter and Feenstra (2002), Chow (2002), Feenstra (1998), Lardy (1992, 1998, 2002), Naughton (1996), and Sachs
and Woo (1997).
3See Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993), and Markusen and Venables (2000) for models where FDI is intended
for the domestic market.
3markets, so that the return to domestic capital may diﬀer from the international cost faced by foreign
producers. In particular, it is lower due to technology-disadvantages of domestic ﬁrms. This assumption
contrasts with the traditional literature on foreign investment, that suggest that FDI tends to equalize the
rate of return on capital throughout a given industry in all countries and/or throughout all industries and
countries. In this paper, foreign producers bring their technologies and capital to produce locally enjoying
low labor costs. Together with capital market segmentation, this is consistent with equilibrium diﬀerences
in the return to capital.
The lower cost of capital and the product-price premium compensate domestic producers for their tech-
nology backwardness. In this setting I analyze the eﬀects on production, employment, wages and capital
ﬂows of tariﬀ and FDI liberalizations. Tariﬀ liberalization implies a change in tariﬀs and relative product
prices without lifting the restricted access of foreign producers to domestic markets. Because wages are
set according to foreign ﬁrms’ competitiveness conditions, they are not aﬀected by the tariﬀ liberalization.
Capital market segmentation assures that domestic production is competitive in at least one industry, and
the structure of domestic production depends on the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure and the sectoral distribution of
technology diﬀerences. If domestic production is only viable in capital-intensive industries, a rise in FDI
is required to clear the labor market. Likewise, if domestic ﬁrms are viable in labor-intensive industries,
capital outﬂows −a fall in the stock of foreign capital− are required to generate the equilibrium increase in
domestic employment. Interestingly, the fall in relative product prices of domestic producers compared to
foreign ﬁrms may be accompanied with an increase in domestic employment.
The liberalization of FDI represents a more radical step. In this case, the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure is also
relevant for foreign producers, that are allowed to sell their products in tariﬀ-protected domestic product
markets, meaning that the product price advantage for domestic producers vanishes. Also, FDI liberalization
comprises the integration of domestic capital markets to world markets. Therefore, the net return to domestic
capital must be equal to the international cost faced by foreign producers, meaning that the pre-liberalization
capital-cost advantage in favor of domestic ﬁrms also disappears. The absorption of all labor by foreign
producers is necessarily accompanied by gross capital inﬂows. A net (of domestic capital outﬂows) increase
4in capital takes place as long FDI rises relatively more in capital-intensive industries, while net capital
outﬂows take place if the expanding foreign ﬁrms are labor intensive.
The disappearance of domestic producers reﬂects that the coexistence of technology-advanced foreign
producers and technology-backward domestic ﬁrms can be only sustained by product and factor market
distortions, unless full technological convergence takes place. Aside from the role of product-level distortions
and capital market segmentation, I analyze a third possibility: capital subsidies. Granting capital subsidies
for low-technology ﬁrms to compensate for the diﬀerence between gross capital return and its opportunity
cost is consistent with domestic production. I therefore estimate the capital subsidies required to compensate
for technology disadvantages of domestic producers.4
The second part of the paper is empirical. Based on the model’s predictions, I analyze the experience
of China in protecting their domestic −specially state-owned− ﬁrms. It has been well documented that
the transition in China, specially since the beginning of the 1990s, has been characterized by important
shrinkage is state-owned production and employment. Indeed, the production of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) represented nearly 78% of total industrial production in 1978 and less than 30% in 1996 (Chow, 2002).
The fall in SOEs’ share in total output has been driven by two forces. First, since the reforms started in the
mid 1980s, SOEs have been subject to increasing competition from collectively-owned enterprises (COEs)
−specially Township and Village enterprises− that are not subject to the tight controls of SOEs.5 Greater
productivity of COEs has introduced cost pressures on state-owned ﬁrms, undermining their competitive
position. As Brandt and Zhu (2000) point out, the policy of granting SOEs credit at subsidized rates is
fundamental to understand their survival in a context of increasing domestic competition.
At the same time, China’s openness to FDI have attracted important amount of foreign capital to the
4Neary (1978a) and others have studied the role of capital subsidies in employment and factor intensities. However, they
focus on the implications of diﬀerences in the ratio of marginal productivity of factors on cross-sectoral factor reallocation, and
not on cross-ﬁrm within-sector or vertical dimensions of capital subsidies.
5See Groves et. al., (1994, 1995) for discussions on the restrictions faced by SOEs, and the role of incentives and management
in their performance.
5mainland. Indeed, China was in 2001 the highest recipient of FDI among developing countries, by far.6 In
addition to this, the share of foreign-invested ﬁrms (FIEs) in industrial production rose from essentially zero
in 1980 to 16.5% in 1996 (Chow, 2002), (21% in 1997 if only establishments with independent accounting
systems −excluding Village enterprises− are considered). The presence of technology-advanced foreign
producers have also introduced signiﬁcant cost pressures to domestic producers, specially in labor markets.
To smooth the impact of FDI on domestic costs, and to avoid a Germany-style shrinkage in SOEs’ production,
the authorities have introduced two types of distortions. First, the degree of integration of the domestic
capital market with the international market is negligible. Therefore, the return to domestic capital in China
diﬀers from the international return. In particular, it is lower due to technology diﬀerences, and hence it
ameliorates the cost pressures on domestic ﬁrms. Also, China has introduced many policies to limit the
access of foreign ﬁrms’ to tariﬀ-protected domestic product markets. Although there are many FIEs selling
their goods in mainland markets, legal and de facto restrictions as well as incentives for foreign ﬁrms to export
their production are tended to introduce a product-price premium in favor of domestic producers.7 The
last section of the paper is devoted to provide evidence on the existence and relevance of these interventions
to explain the coexistence of China’s state-owned ﬁrms with technology-advanced COEs and FIEs.
2 The Model
2.1 Homogeneous domestic ﬁrms
Consider a small open economy that produces i tradable goods with constant-returns-to-scale technologies
and two factors of production: labor L and capital K (Jones, 1965, 1971). Within each industry, two types
of ﬁrms coexist: technology-backward domestic ﬁrms (d) and technology-advanced foreign ﬁrms (f). Labor
in completelly mobile across sectors and ﬁrms, so the wage rate is unique in the economy. Capital markets
are segmented, however. Foreign ﬁrms have access to international ﬁnancial markets, where the cost of
6United Nations World Investment Report, 2002.
7See footnote 2.
6capital is r∗. Domestic capital is restricted to domestic ﬁrms, that do not have access to international
capital markets, and full capital mobility across domestic ﬁrms assure a unique return to domestic capital
in the long run, that can diﬀer from r∗.







i is the price of good i faced by ﬁrm type n, and w and rn
i are the returns to labor and sector-
speciﬁc capital, respectively. Technology parameters an
Fi (inverse of average productivity) are functions of
relative factor prices and exogenous technological conditions.















· r∗ + ci. (2)
where p∗
i is the international price of good i, faced by the foreign producer, and ci > 0 is the unit
cost for a foreign ﬁrm to produce domestically. The eﬀective price of a foreign producer in the domestic
country is p∗
i − ci. The rationale for foreign investment is that, doted with better technologies, they are
willing to produce abroad to enjoy lower wages. In equilibrium however, the return to capital is r∗. ci may
represent the native entrepreneurs’ advantage over a foreign rival from its general accumulation of knowledge
about his home market (Caves, 1971). A value of ci greater than zero is consistent with international wage
diﬀerences; otherwise, zero-proﬁt conditions (2) hold in the foreign country too, and there is international
wage equalization. For presentation purposes and without any loss of generality, I assume ci =0 .
Given p∗
i, and r∗, the equilibrium wage rate w∗ is such that (2) holds in all industries where foreign
production takes place. I assume that there is a unique w∗ that make (2) hold in all industries. Domestic
producers face the wage rate consistent with foreign ﬁrms’ production.8 If domestic technologies were
identical to those of foreign ﬁrms and there were international capital mobility, condition (2) would hold for
8There exists ample evidence that foreign producers pay higher wages than their domestic counterparts (see Lipsey, 2002
for a survey). To the extent that these diﬀerences reﬂect diﬀerences in job or workers characteristics, their inclusion in the
analysis is not relevant. If diﬀerences in wage payments reﬂect labor market regulations, they become an additional source of
7domestic ﬁrms, too.9 However, I assume that domestic and foreign production techniques − an
Fi − diﬀer
for two reasons. First, diﬀerences in relative factor prices aﬀect the optimal factor intensity in each sector.
This reﬂects the traditional movement along an isoquant. Also, technologies may diﬀer even at similar
factor intensities. In particular, I assume that after correcting for diﬀerences in factor intensities, there are
Hicks-neutral technology diﬀerences −δi− between domestic and foreign ﬁrms, so that
ad



















where Ri = r∗/ri,θ
f
Fi is the share of factor F = L,K in value-added in foreign ﬁrm in industry i, and
σi is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in industry i.10 Plugging (3) and (4) into (1),
and assuming pi = p∗
















If δi > 0 (domestic ﬁrms are technology backward), equation (5) holds as long as Ri is greater than one,
implying that ri <r ∗. In other words, domestic ﬁrms’ technological backwardness are compensated with
lower cost on capital. This is possible in a long run equilibrium as long as capital markets are segmented.
However, even with capital market segmentation, the long run return to domestic capital must be equal-
ized across industries. And this does not necessarily follow from (5). To assure positive domestic production
in all sectors in the long run, the government segments goods markets. Consider that domestic ﬁrms can
sell their products in tariﬀ-protected domestic markets, so that pi = p∗
i(1 + τi),w h e r ep∗
i is the world price
of good i. Foreign ﬁrms are restricted to access domestic markets, so they face a product price equal to p∗
i.
technology-diﬀerences compensation. The model could be simply extended to allow for wage diﬀerences between domestic and
foreign ﬁrms.
9If ci > 0,d o m e s t i cﬁrms would have proﬁts, implying that foreign production would not be viable. In other words, FDI
will take place as long as there exist some technological advantage of foreign producers that more than compensates the net
product price disadvantage.
10The elasticity of substitution is deﬁned as σi = dlog(K/L)/dlog(w/r). In a constant-returns-to-scale technology, it is
possible to show that d aLi = −θKiσi(b w − b r) and d aKi = θLiσi(b w − b r).
8Therefore, the zero-proﬁt condition for domestic ﬁrms in industry i, imposing cross-industry domestic rental
rate equalization, is given by















The sector-speciﬁct a r i ﬀ rate is uniquely determined for any given level of R. Equation (6) deﬁnes
as y s t e mo fi equations and i +1unknowns (τi,R) which solution is the sector-speciﬁct a r i ﬀ rate and
the domestic return to capital consistent with zero proﬁts in all industries. A unique solution could be
determined imposing an additional restriction −i.e., on average tariﬀs−, but for the sake of the argument I
assume that sector-speciﬁct a r i ﬀ rates are exogenous. The tariﬀ structure −computed as the ratio of (1+τi)
































The intuition for (7) is the following. Ceteris paribus, tariﬀs must be greater in those sectors with greater
technology backwardness. This is because wage pressures from foreign ﬁr m sh u r tm o s tt h o s es e c t o r sw i t h
worse technologies. Additionally, given technology diﬀerences, a higher cost of capital (a fall in R) generates
as h i f ti nt a r i ﬀs toward capital-intensive sectors, unless the second-order eﬀects associated with changes in
factor intensities dominate. I assume this is not the case. Higher capital costs beneﬁt most labor-intensive
industries, so that lower product-price compensations for these industries are required. As R tends to zero,
tariﬀs may end up being higher in capital-intensive sectors even if the technology gap between domestic and
foreign ﬁrms are lower in these sectors.
The initial equilibrium is therefore characterized by technology-advanced foreign ﬁrms producing in all
industries. Production of technology backward domestic ﬁrms is supported through two mechanisms. First,
the capital market is segmented, so the return to capital domestically diﬀers from r∗. Abstracting from
second-order eﬀects of diﬀerences in relative factor prices11, the pre-liberalization domestic return to capital










11(R − 1)2 ≈ 0.
9where υi0 =( 1+τi0)/(1 + δi) is the technology-adjusted or net product-price ratio of domestic to foreign
ﬁrms. I assume it is lower than one so that the domestic return to capital is lower than r∗. In general,
τi0 refers to any distortion that introduces a gross (of productivity diﬀerences) product-price advantage for
domestic ﬁrms vis-a-vis foreign producers. Capital market segmentation and the restricted access of foreign
producers to tariﬀ-protected domestic ﬁrms assure that there is a structure of sectoral tariﬀs and a unique
return to domestic capital consistent with zero proﬁts for domestic ﬁrms in all industries.
We are now ready to analyze the impact on employment and factor returns of tariﬀ and FDI liberalization.
The former comprises a change in the tariﬀ structure relevant for domestic ﬁrms, keeping the capital market
segmented and without opening domestic product markets to foreign ﬁrms. FDI liberalization implies
the opening of tariﬀ-protected domestic markets to foreign ﬁrms’ production, as well as opening domestic
ﬁnancial markets. In equilibrium, the return to domestic capital must be equalized across domestic ﬁrms
i nt h ec a s eo fap u r et a r i ﬀ liberalization (although it may continue to diﬀer from the international return to
capital), and it must also be equal to r∗ in the case of FDI liberalization.
2.1.1 Tariﬀ Liberalization
Consider an exogenous fall in tariﬀs. Regardless of the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure, zero-proﬁt conditions for
foreign ﬁrms have not changed, and hence the wage rate is equal to its pre-liberalization level. Capital
market segmentation assures that domestic production is viable in at least one industry. That will depend
on the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure. If τi1 is such that (6) holds for all ﬁrms with a unique return to capital, all












where υi1 =( 1+τi1)/(1 + δi) <υ i0. The lower return to capital is the market mechanism to adjust for
the lower productivity-adjusted product price ratio of domestic to foreign products. The fall in the relative
cost of capital implies that all domestic industries become more capital intensive. For a given domestic
capital stock K, and for a constant level of domestic employment
¡
Ld = L − Lf¢
12, this implies a shift
12L
¡
= Ld + Lf¢
represents the aggregate labor force in the home economy, of which Ld is employed in domestic ﬁrms and
10in domestic production toward labor-intensive industries.13 This is consistent with the shift in the tariﬀ
structure in favor of labor-intensive industries required for all domestic industries to remain competitive.
Indeed, from (7), ∂ [(1 + τx)/(1 + τy)]/∂R > 0 if and only if x is labor-intensive. However, the total level
of domestic employment depends on possible changes in foreign capital stock. Although the level of foreign
capital stock is not determined in the model, consider for the sake of the argument that FDI increases.
Because neither relative factor prices nor foreign ﬁrms’ factor intensities changes, increases in foreign capital
imply a movement of workers from domestic to foreign ﬁrms, shifting the domestic production structure
toward capital-intensive industries. It is reasonable to think that FDI would not change −because foreign
ﬁrms’ conditions have not changed. However, the potential impact of the tariﬀ reform on foreign investment
have important implications for output and employment patterns.
Consider now that the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure is inconsistent with positive production of domestic producers
in all industries. The return to domestic capital becomes
rm1











where rm1, lower than r0, represents the return to capital in sector m where domestic ﬁrms are compet-
itive. In other words, zero proﬁts are only attainable in industry m.G i v e n w∗ and rm, domestic relative
factor usage is given by km = Km/Lm = aKm(w/rm)/aLm(w/rm), that may diﬀer from kd = K/Ld.I f




is employed by foreign ﬁrms.
The increase in foreign ﬁrms’ employment requires a rise in foreign capital, unlike the case when domestic
producers can absorb Ld. The rationale for the rise in FDI is that unemployment is not an equilibrium, as
long as a fall in wages would generate proﬁts for foreign producers. It is not possible to establish in which
industries the capital stock −and employment− increases, and therefore nothing can be said regarding the
size of capital inﬂows. Likewise, if km <k d, capital outﬂows take place, and post-integration domestic
employment is greater than Ld. It is important to notice that complete specialization is not required to
generate capital ﬂows, but rather than competitive domestic industries are not able to absorb the domestic
Lf in foreign ﬁrms.
13Mussa (1974), Neary (1978b).
11pre-liberalization factor availability kd.
Even if the new tariﬀ structure pushes for specialization, the government may choose to subsidize the
return to capital in those industries i where ri <r m to make them viable. The subsidy required to equalize

















In this case, we are back to the scenario where the equilibrium is reached without international capital
ﬂows, as domestic ﬁrms are able to absorb kd. Nevertheless, as ﬁrms choose their optimal factor intensities
based on gross relative factor prices, all domestic industries except the one that is not granted subsidy
become more capital intensive, shifting the production structure toward labor-intensive goods even more
than the case where the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure was consistent with zero proﬁts in all domestic ﬁrms.
2.1.2 FDI Liberalization
Consider now that foreign ﬁrms are allowed to sell their products locally, meaning that the new tariﬀ vector
is relevant for foreign ﬁrms. In other words, national treatment for FIEs yields product price equalization
between domestic and foreign producers in each industry. Also, FDI liberalization is accompanied by
domestic ﬁnancial market liberalization, so that the net return to domestic capital must be equal to r∗.
The impact on wages will depend on the sector-bias of relative product-price changes for foreign ﬁrms,
reﬂected in the sector bias of the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure. For simplicity, consider that the new tariﬀ structure




Lj for all i,j.14
Consequently, the long run change in the wage rate is given by τi1/θ
∗
Li ≥ 0.
Regardless on the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure, domestic production is not viable with complete product and factor
market integration. Unless full technological convergence of domestic ﬁrms takes place, foreign ﬁrms’ and
domestic ﬁrms’ zero-proﬁt conditions cannot hold at the same time. Therefore, all labor ends up employed





= τi1. Zero proﬁts for foreign ﬁrms in all industries is possible if tariﬀs are greater in labor-
intensive industries.
12capital intensive in the post-liberalization equilibrium, meaning that labor market equilibrium is not possible
without changes in foreign capital stock. If FDI increases in labor-intensive industries, small gross capital
inﬂows are compatible with labor market equilibrium, but if FDI increases in capital-intensive industries,
higher gross capital inﬂows are needed to absorb domestic labor. Overall, if the most expansionary foreign
ﬁrms are those in capital-intensive industries, net (of domestic capital outﬂows) capital inﬂows will take
place and a shift in aggregate production toward capital-intensive sectors follow. The opposite happens if
FDI increases are greater in labor-intensive industries.
The absorption of pre-liberalization domestic employment by foreign ﬁrms could also follow from a
reallocation of FDI across industries so that foreign capital increases in labor-intensive ﬁrms and falls in
capital in capital-intensive industries, keeping the aggregate level of foreign capital constant. A shift of the
production structure toward labor-intensive industries follows and net capital outﬂows amount for the level
of domestic capital. In this case though, it is more diﬃcult to argue in favor of a shrinkage in FDI stocks
in capital-intensive industries, because of the increase in product prices.
If the ﬁnal tariﬀ structure is such that foreign production is viable in only one industry, it is still the
case that domestic production is not viable in any sector. The absorption of labor originally employed
in domestic ﬁrms by foreign ﬁr m si sp o s s i b l ew i t hg r o s sc a p i t a li n ﬂows. If the capital-labor ratio of the
competitive foreign producer −evaluated at post-liberalization relative factor prices− is greater than kd,n e t
capital outﬂows take place. Otherwise, full employment is reached with net capital inﬂows.
The disappearance of domestic production can be avoided with capital subsidies. The capital subsidy










i1 =1 /(1 + δi) <υ i1 < 1. The access of foreign ﬁrms to tariﬀ-protected domestic product
markets increases the productivity-adjusted product price ratio of foreign to domestic producers. The
subsidy depends positively on the technology gap between foreign and domestic ﬁrms, and negatively on the
share of capital in value-added. Wage pressures from foreign ﬁrms rise marginal costs more in labor-intensive
13industries, and hence greater subsidies are needed in those industries. The subsidy is higher than under
pure tariﬀ liberalization (equation (11)), when it compensates for the diﬀerence between the sector-speciﬁc
return to capital and the return set by the most competitive domestic industry rm, that was lower than r∗.
With capital market integration and the liberalization of FDI, the subsidy compensates for the diﬀerence
between the sector-speciﬁcd o m e s t i cr e t u r na n dr∗.
2.2 Heterogeneous domestic ﬁrms
Consider now that within the domestic economy, two types of ﬁrms coexist: s for state-owned enterprises
and p for privately-owned enterprises. Following the notation in section 2.1, the Hicks-neutral technology
gap between domestic ﬁrms type α = s,p and foreign ﬁrms in industry i is δ
α




i for all i. Initially,
only ﬁrms type s and p have access to tariﬀ-protected domestic product markets. Also, they hire capital
from the domestic capital market, that is segmented from international ﬁnancial markets. Finally, the wage
rate is set according to foreign ﬁrms’ competitiveness conditions. The zero-proﬁt condition for ﬁrm type α
in industry i is given by
























i, (13) holds for all ﬁrms as long as Rs
i >R
p
i, that is, if the cost of capital for ﬁrms type s is lower
than for ﬁrms type p. Assuming that the domestic capital market is competitive, the net return to capital is
equal across ﬁrms and sectors. Therefore, production of s−type ﬁrms is possible if they are granted capital
subsidies. Type p ﬁrms are not granted capital subsidies, and hence I assume that tariﬀs τi0 are such that
(13) holds for all ﬁrms type p with a unique return to capital Rp.G i v e n τi0 and Rp, nothing assures that
the return to capital that make (13) hold for all ﬁrms type s is unique. In particular, the capital subsidy
in industry i that equalizes the net return to capital to Rp −as percentage of the international return to




























i0 =( 1+τi0)/(1 + δ
α
i ). For the capital subsidy to be equal across sectors, technology diﬀerences
14between ﬁrms type s and p must be greater in labor-intensive industries. In general, it is increasing on the
technology-adjusted product price of ﬁrms type p vis-a-vis ﬁrms type s. This is explained by the technology




i > 0. A l s o ,a l t h o u g hb o t ht y p e so fﬁrms have access to tariﬀ-
protected domestic goods markets, the subsidy is increasing on τi0. This is because the percentage increase
in productivity-adjusted product price for a given tariﬀ is greater in technology-advanced ﬁrms. This is a
very important result. If restrictions to foreign ﬁrms’ access to tariﬀ-protected domestic goods markets are
aimed to protect technology-backward ﬁrms type s, they introduce a product price advantage in favor of
ﬁrms type p that has to be compensated with greater capital subsidies.
2.2.1 Tariﬀ Liberalization
As in the case of homogeneous domestic ﬁrms, zero-proﬁt conditions for foreign ﬁrms do not change, and
wages stay constant. Also, capital market segmentation assures that domestic production is competitive,
at least by one type of ﬁrm in one industry. If pre-liberalization capital subsidies do not change, the net
return to capital in ﬁrms type p is lower than for s-type ﬁrms. Therefore, either subsidies fall or the former
disappear.
If subsidies do not change, production of ﬁrms type s is viable in all industries as long as the new tariﬀ
structure assures net rental rate equalization across industries. In other words, if diﬀerences in the return to
capital implicit in (13) are equal to pre-liberalization capital subsidies. In this case, labor market equilibrium
is reached without capital ﬂows. Otherwise, we are back in the case where domestic production is viable in
only one industry, and capital inﬂows (outﬂows) will take place if the competitive industry is (capital) labor
intensive.
2.2.2 FDI Liberalization
As in the case of homogeneous ﬁrms, the access of foreign producers to tariﬀ-protected domestic markets
imply a rise in wages. Unless full technology convergence takes place, both types of domestic ﬁrms become











i1 =1 /(1 + δ
α
i ) < 1. The absorption of all labor by foreign ﬁrms requires again gross capital
inﬂows. Depending on whether they are greater on labor- or capital-intensive industries, net capital outﬂows
or inﬂows are required to achieve labor market equilibrium.
3 An Application: China in the mid 1990s
The following section presents evidence on the relevance of the mechanisms emphasized in the model to
protect domestic ﬁrms. In particular, I present evidence on the dual economic structure existent in China,
and on how this structure is aimed to protect state-owned enterprises from collective and foreign ﬁrms’
competition.
The starting point of the analysis is presented in ﬁgure 1, that plots 3-digit ISIC tariﬀs for 1996 from
UNCTAD (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2001) against capital intensity, measured as capital per worker in the
same industries in the United States. There is no reliable data on sectoral capital intensity in China, and
the usage of U.S. ﬁg u r e si sr e a s o n a b l ea sl o n ga sd i ﬀerences in capital per worker are mainly technology
driven and not very much aﬀected by diﬀerences in relative factor prices.15 It is evident that China
protects labor-intensive industries most. Why does China protects those sectors where it is supposed to
have comparative advantage? New trade theory would suggest economies of scale or the "import protection
as export promotion" principle as an explanation for this puzzle. The model suggests a very diﬀerent
explanation; China protects industries with greater technology disadvantages of domestic vis-à-vis foreign
producers, meaning that technology diﬀerences are greater in labor-intensive industries.
[Figure 1]
15To check this, I proxy capital intensity in China dividing the nominal value of total assets in each industry on sectoral
employment for state-, collectively-, and foreign-owned enterprises in 1996. The results are very similar.
16Is there direct evidence on this? The Appendix presents a methodology to estimate sector-speciﬁc
Hicks-neutral technology diﬀerences between domestic and foreign ﬁrms. The methodology has two steps.
First, I estimate the ratio of domestic to foreign ﬁrms’ return to capital, for collective and state-owned ﬁrms
separately. For COEs I assume that the return to capital is equalized across industries and estimate the
cost of capital that best ﬁts the relative factor usage of collective and foreign ﬁrms within each sector. For
SOEs, I estimate the average capital subsidy they are granted based on aggregate ﬁgures of ﬁscal subsidies
to state-owned ﬁrms, and deduct it from collective ﬁrms’ net return to capital to get a ﬁgure on state-owned
ﬁrms’ gross return of capital. The results show that the return to capital in COEs in 1996 was 47% of the
return to capital for foreign ﬁrms’ located in China. Given subsidies to SOEs of around 3% of aggregate
GDP, the return to capital for SOEs was on average 17% of foreign ﬁrms’ capital return, meaning that if the
international return to capital is 10%, the return to capital in SOEs is 1.7%.16
Data on capital costs, relative wages (from Zhao, 2001), factor shares (China’s Statistical Yearbook,
1997) and tariﬀ rates (Nicita and Olarregaga, 2001) are combined to estimate the sector-speciﬁcH i c k s -
neutral technology parameter δ
α
i for α =state- and collectively-owned that ﬁts perfectly each zero-proﬁt
condition. The results are reported in Table 1, that shows two alternative measures of δi for each type of
ﬁrm. δi1 assumes diﬀerences in product prices of domestic ﬁrms vis-à-vis foreign ﬁrms based on tariﬀs. In
other words, it assumes that domestic ﬁrms sell their products in tariﬀ-protected domestic markets while
foreign ﬁrms face international prices. δi2 assumes no diﬀerences in product prices. The last two columns
reports sectoral nominal tariﬀs and capital per worker for U.S. ﬁrms.
[Table 1]
Several elements are worth noticing of Table 1. First, the technology gap is greater for state-owned
enterprises. The productivity advantages of COEs has been widely documented, (i.e., Brandt and Zhu,
2000; and Jeﬀerson et. al., 1999) and it is consistent with the declining share of SOEs production on hands of
16Using data from China’s Industrial Statistics Yearbook for 1998, the ratio of SOEs (COEs) to FIEs proﬁts as percentage
of value-added is .3 (.56) (Lemoine 2000). These numbers are not very diﬀerent from the .17(.47) ﬁgures obtained in my
estimations.
17COEs. Second, the correlation coeﬃcient of technology diﬀerences and capital per worker is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r oo fC O E s ,b u ti ti ss i g n i ﬁcantly negative for SOEs, revealing that the technology gap of
state-owned ﬁrms is greater in labor-intensive industries, exactly those with greatest tariﬀs. Third, the
correlation between nominal tariﬀ and δi2 is positive and signiﬁcant for both types of ﬁrms, revealing the
direct positive association between protection and technology diﬀerences (see Figure 2 for SOEs).17 This
is exactly the mechanism emphasized in the paper. According to the model, tariﬀsa r eg r e a t e ri nt h o s e
industries with greater technology backwardness, that are labor-intensive industries.
[Figure 2]
The rationality of this explanation rests on two elements. First, that the domestic capital market is
segmented from international markets. Otherwise, it would be diﬃcult to explain diﬀerences in the return
to capital. The restrictions of foreign ﬁnancial institutions to penetrate the Chinese market has been widely
documented (Lardy, 2002). For example, the share of domestic credit issued by foreign banks was only 0.01
percent of total domestic credit outstanding from all ﬁnancial institutions in 1998.18
According to the model, capital market segmentation must be accompanied by capital subsidies to low-
technology state-owned enterprises. Brandt and Zhu (2000) provide extensive evidence on the subsidies
granted to state-owned ﬁrms by state-controlled banks in China. Lemoine (2000), using data from China’s
Statistical Yearbook of 1998, shows that sectoral proﬁts of state-owned enterprises are positively and signif-
icantly correlated with SOEs’ share in sectoral output in 1997, that is greater in capital-intensive industries
are evident in Table 2. This suggests that capital subsidies −required to equalize the net return to capital
across state-owned ﬁrms− are greater in labor-intensive industries.19 This matches the predictions of the
model, as long as technology diﬀerences are greater in labor-intensive industries. Indeed, the correlation
17Recall that δi2 is computed without tariﬀ data, and so there is no spurious correlation between technology diﬀerences and
tariﬀ rates.
18Xu Binglan "Wider Bank Access Mooted" China Daily Business Weekly, April 27, 1998 and People’s Bank of China,
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin (3), 1999.
19Lardy (2002) shows that the textile industry, a labor-intensive industry, was in 1996 the biggest money-losing sector in
state-owned manufacturing. During the 1990s, the fall in state employment in textile production was greater than 35%.




i2) is -.46 if all industries are considered, and -.26
excluding Petroleum industries.20
[Table 2]
Evidence on the limits of foreign ﬁrms’ to access tariﬀ-protected product markets is more indirect. Table
2 shows the distribution of employment and value-added between state, collective and foreign enterprises for
3-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors in 199621, revealing a high dispersion of FIEs penetration. What explains
the diﬀerent rates of penetration of foreign ﬁrms across industries?22 Figure 3 plots the share of foreign
ﬁrms in total sectoral output against capital intensity. The negative and signiﬁcant association reveals
that foreign ﬁrms’ penetration is greater in labor-intensive industries, suggesting that foreign investment
is driven by factor-price diﬀerences. This point is emphasized by the positive and signiﬁcant correlation
between foreign ﬁrms’ output penetration and technology diﬀerences in state-owned enterprises (.63 and
.82, depending on the measure of technology diﬀerence). This suggests that FIEs penetration is greater in
industries intensive in those factors with relative low cost if China’s capital and labor markets were closed.
If FDI were driven by other incentives rather than cost diﬀerences −like tariﬀ-jumping−, a high correlation
between foreign ﬁrms’ penetration and factor intensity would not necessarily be found.
[Figure 3]
The share in production does not point out to the key aspect of the penetration of foreign ﬁrms in
consumption. It is well documented that several restrictions apply for foreign ﬁrms selling in tariﬀ-protected
domestic markets. First, there are many incentives for foreign ﬁrms to export a considerable portion of
their output. As part of the "Twenty-two Regulations" established in 1986 to deﬁne an export oriented
20The estimation of technology diﬀerences for SOEs assumed a common subsidy across all industries. If we were to consider
a sector-speciﬁc subsidy −greater in labor-intensive industries− the pattern of ﬁgure 2 would be even more dramatic.
213-digit ISIC sectors are 28, but China’s authorities keep records (at least public ones) for 23 aggregates, which are detailed
in the table. Hereafter, all the analysis is done based on those 23 categories.
22The data in table 2 only refers to share in production, and says nothing with respect to where that production is sold.
19ﬁrm, tariﬀ exemptions and tax beneﬁts are granted subject to export performance.23 To some extent, these
interventions create an export-promotion and an import-substitution regime at the same time, although the
incentives to export somehow undermine the price advantage that tariﬀ protection confer domestic ﬁrms. In
1994, only 31% of imports in China were on products to be sold to domestic ﬁrms or consumers.24 Another
41% came in as processing trade, which is later exported, and a further 20% of imports were initial investment
of joint ventures, revealing the export orientation of foreign invested ﬁrms. Indeed, in the late 1990s, FIEs’
production represented almost 20% of manufacturing output and their share in total exports was higher than
50%.25
Although there are many FIEs selling in domestic markets and also many SOEs exporting, there are many
restrictions −specially from local governments− that limit FIEs’ access to domestic market and help introduce
an artiﬁcial product-price premium to state-owned ﬁrms (See Rosen, 1998; Branstetter and Feenstra, 2002).
For example, foreign companies must use a government-approved Chinese company that has trading rights
in order to trade with China. In addition, they must use a Chinese distributor to distribute imports in
the domestic market.26 Also, legal restrictions and discrimination in legal procedures −specially from local
governments−, de facto legal and illegal surcharges, local governments’ control over distribution channels
have signiﬁcantly aﬀected the ability of foreign ﬁrms’ to access domestic markets. A diﬀerent and more
indirect evidence on this is provided by Young (2001). Restrictions to inter-regional trade of goods serve
as product-level distortions to protect domestic ﬁrms in those regions with low foreign ﬁrms’ production
penetration. Table 3 shows that FIEs’ consumption penetration in 1995 was very low except for in those
regions with special incentives for foreign producers.27 Even if foreign ﬁrms are eventually able to sell part
23See Branstetter and Feenstra (2002).
24Survey of China’s International Trade, International Trade Center, UNCTAD/WTO, 1995.
25See 2000 Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on the 2000 National Economic and Social Development
Report.
26Indeed, one of the most important aspects of China’s protocol accession into the WTO is related to the facilitation of
distribution of foreign ﬁrms’ products on domestic markets (Lardy, 2002).
27The share in apparent consumption for region r of ﬁrm type i is calculated as (Qri − Xri)/(Qr − Xr + Mr),w h e r eQri−Xri
is production net of exports, and Qr − Xr + Mr is total (apparent) consumption.
20of their products in domestic markets, these distortions introduce a gap in the net product price as perceived
by FIEs vis-à-vis domestic ﬁrms.
[Table 3]
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The traditional paradigm of international trade is the absolute technology diﬀerences do not matter; the com-
parative advantage principle suggests that the pattern of production is determined by relative productivity
diﬀerences. The theoretical strength of this approach rests, among other things, on the assumption regard-
ing international factor market segmentation. If factors cannot move internationally, absolute technology
diﬀerences are compensated with factor price diﬀerences, with no eﬀect on the pattern of production.
International integration of factor markets can take several forms, like lifting restrictions for workers’
movements, or liberalizing the capital account. This paper argues that the liberalization of Foreign Direct
Investment is equivalent to factor market integration. The access of technology-advanced foreign pro-
ducers to domestic markets pressures factor prices up, rendering domestic ﬁrms uncompetitive. Absolute
rather than relative technology diﬀerences determine the pattern of production between domestic and foreign
producers. Rather than across-country factor movements, FDI liberalization generates across-ﬁrm factor
reallocation. Moreover, this side of trade liberalization contrasts with traditional across-industry factor
reallocation from tariﬀ changes.
The cost pressures faced by domestic ﬁrms make governments react to avoid the collapse of domestic
production. This reaction may not be optimal. Indeed, in the limit all factors end up employed in high-
technology ﬁrms receiving high returns. However, pressures to protect domestic productions do exist, and
countries may end up introducing distortions in product and factor markets to compensate for technology
disadvantages. Evidence from China suggests that limits to foreign ﬁrms’ access to tariﬀ-protected domestic
markets, a low degree of international ﬁnancial integration, and capital subsidies to state-owned ﬁrms have
played a role in sustaining domestic −specially SOEs− employment and production.
21From a global perspective, the consequences of FDI liberalization are far-reaching. From a welfare point
of view, it can push toward factor price convergence without need for factor ﬂows, a very contentious issue
in developed and developing countries alike (Rodrik, 1997). From a trade perspective, it can reinforce the
role of factor abundance of the pattern of production. Finally, to the extent that technology diﬀerences are
endogenous to the existence of domestic distortions (Parente and Prescott, 2000), it emphasizes the need for
broad liberalization in less-developed countries.
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26Appendix
Following the notation in section 2, the zero-proﬁt condition for any domestic ﬁrm d = s,c in sector i





With this notation, we can compare the average productivity of labor and capital (1/aLi and 1/aKi)i n













wd(1 + τi) (A2)
Similar for capital. Cross-country diﬀerences in average factor productivity are twofold. First, relative
factor prices may diﬀer across countries. Therefore, ﬁrms choose diﬀerent factor intensities that result
in diﬀerences in the average and marginal productivity of factors. The second source of diﬀerence in
average productivity follows from genuine technology diﬀerences. For similar relative factor prices, average
productivity may diﬀer (ad
Fi = a∗
Fi(1+δFi)). If δFi > 0, technology in the foreign country is more advanced
than in the home country.


































rd(1 + τi) (A4)
where σi is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in industry i.28 The term (b w − b r)
refers to the adjustment required to equalize relative factor prices in the home and foreign countries at the
home’s ratio.
Deﬁning w = w∗ and r∗ = rR,
³
c w∗ − b r∗
´
c a nb ew r i t t e na s(R−1). Using data for factor shares, sectoral
tariﬀs and the elasticity of substitution, equations (A3) and (A4) constitute a system with three unknowns;
28The deﬁnition of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is σi =dln(Ki/Li)/dln(w/r). The percentage
change in aLi and aKi for changes in relative factor prices can be written as d aLi = −θKiσi(b w − b r) and d aKi = θLiσi(b w − b r).
27δLi,δKi, and R. However, assuming that technology diﬀerences are Hicks-neutral (δLi = δKi = δi), and















Li). Equation (A5) is a second-order equation on R.A s s u m i n g c r o s s -
industry equalization of relative factor-price ratios −R− this condition is valid in all sectors. Therefore, we
can use cross-sector data to estimate the (unobserved) value of R that best ﬁts this equation in all industries.
With the estimation of R we can recover the value of δi that makes each zero-proﬁt condition ﬁtp e r f e c t l y .
For that, consider rewriting equation (A1) as
pw
i (1 + τi)=( 1+δi)[a∗
Li(1 − θ
∗
Kiσi(R − 1)) · w + a∗
Ki(1 + θ
∗
Liσi(R − 1)) · r]. (A6)
that can be rewritten as














Two measures of δi are computed: δi1 allows for diﬀerences in product prices due to tariﬀs. Strictly speak-
ing, (1 + τi) refers to relative value-added tariﬀs, that can be approximated as (1 + τi)(1− θIi)/(1 − θ
∗
Ii),
where τi is the nominal tariﬀ in sector i,a n dθIi is the share in output of intermediate inputs, computed
using sectoral data on output and value-added. The results are very similar if nominal tariﬀsa r eu s e d .
The second estimate, δi2,c o n s i d e r s(1 + τi)=1 . Diﬀerences in product prices are more diﬃcult to observe
directly, and δi2 accounts for the part of technology diﬀerences that is not driven by diﬀerences in product
prices.
The data required to estimate A5, reported in Table 4, are obtained from several sources. Factor shares
are based on ﬁrms with independent accounting systems (that excludes Village enterprises), from China’s
Statistical Yearbook. Tariﬀs are obtained from Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). Finally, the elasticity of
substitution is obtained from Claro (2003). The estimation of A5 for collectively-owned enterprises yields a
value for R of 2.11, meaning that the estimated ratio of capital return in collective to foreign ﬁrms, rc/r∗,
is .47. If σi =1for all i, rc/r∗ = .51, revealing that the results are mainly driven by diﬀerences in factor




i2 are reported in columns 1 and 2 of table 1.
28For state-owned enterprises, estimating rs/r∗ is more complex because SOEs are subject to credit sub-
sidies. While factor intensities are decided on the basis of gross factor costs, factor shares are computed
using net factor prices. Therefore, measures of θK and θL are not reliable in order to compute factor price
diﬀerences. Nevertheless, we can recover an estimate of rs/r∗ by deducting from rc/r∗ an estimate of the
average subsidy given to SOEs (rs/r∗ = rc/r∗−ss/r∗), as a percentage of the international return to capital.
The subsidy is computed as
ss

















where S = ssKs/Y T stands for the total costs of capital subsidies as a percentage of aggregate GDP
(estimated around 3% in 1993, according to Brandt and Zhu, 2000), θ
∗
K = .75 is the average share of capital
costs in foreign ﬁrms in manufacturing, obtained from China’s Statistical Yearbook. K∗/Ks = .36 is the





Ki and Li are nominal assets and employment levels in SOEs in 1996. φ
∗
m = .16 and φ
m = .3 are the share
of foreign production in manufacturing output and the share of manufacturing production in total GDP,
respectively, also from China’s Statistical Yearbook. This yields a value for ss/r∗ of .3, that deducted from
t h ee s t i m a t eo frs/r∗ yields a value for rs/r∗ of .17, that is used to compute δ
s
i from A7.29 The results are
reported in columns 3 and 4 in table 2.
[Insert Table 4]
29According to (A8), ss/r∗ ≈ 10 · S. For other values of S, the resulting subsidy and technology diﬀerences between state-
and foreign-owned enterprises change accordingly, but the sectorial distribution of δ is hardly aﬀected. In other words, the
result that technology deﬁciencies are greater in labor-intensive industries is not aﬀected by the value of S considered.
29Figure 1
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Food 2.32 1.04 4.85 3.72 40.4% 60.1
Beverage 2.38 1.01 6.87 3.42 60.5% 134.6
Tobacco 2.35 1.24 4.65 1.25 70.0% 183.5
Textiles 1.73 1.02 3.10 2.50 28.9% 36.8
Apparel & Footwear 1.86 0.97 4.96 3.33 49.5% 10.9
Leather 1.77 0.97 5.06 3.58 33.7% 23.5
Wood 2.07 1.03 3.89 2.52 19.4% 33.0
Furniture 1.96 1.01 4.39 2.54 46.1% 16.7
Paper 1.63 1.01 2.84 1.95 21.2% 146.8
Printing 0.86 1.03 2.35 2.00 18.5% 37.7
Chemicals 0.95 1.02 2.38 2.89 17.6% 192.1
Petroleum 2.03 1.05 1.45 0.70 11.2% 426.3
Rubber 1.61 0.99 2.35 1.91 21.0% 49.7
Plastic 1.51 1.01 3.02 3.01 32.1% 48.6
Pottery and Glass 1.46 1.02 2.21 1.61 30.4% 55.5
Iron & Steel 1.32 0.93 1.21 0.51 10.0% 107.7
Non-ferrous Metals 1.59 1.03 2.94 2.39 8.7% 84.3
Fabricated Metal Products 2.12 1.02 3.67 2.02 21.2% 34.2
Machinery, except electrical 1.91 1.02 1.81 1.06 17.5% 49.8
Machinery, electrical 2.29 1.01 6.45 3.44 22.4% 73.3
Transport 1.93 1.01 3.94 2.93 27.0% 79.2
Professional & Scientific equipment 2.39 0.97 5.65 3.34 22.3% 53.7
Other 1.63 0.98 3.83 2.97 39.4% 23.8




 : Technology Difference with product-price premium for domestic firms (See appendix for details.)
δ2
n
 : Technology Difference without product-price premium for domestic firms (See appendix for details.)
τ96 : Tariffs in 1999 from US-China Business Council
K/L
 : Capital per Workers (Thoursands of US Dollars) in U.S. Manufacturing Industry.Employment Output
Industry (ISIC Code) Share* Share* State Collective Foreign
Food (311) 6% 7% 38% 41% 22%
Beverage (313) 2% 3% 52% 26% 22%
Tobacco (314) 0% 5% 98% 1% 1%
Textiles (321) 12% 7% 32% 51% 17%
Apparel & Footwear (322, 324) 4% 3% 6% 53% 41%
Leather (323) 2% 2% 7% 49% 43%
Wood (331) 1% 1% 15% 65% 20%
Furniture (332) 1% 1% 7% 69% 24%
Paper (341) 3% 2% 35% 51% 14%
Printing (342) 2% 1% 40% 41% 19%
Chemicals (351, 352) 10% 12% 44% 38% 18%
Petroleum (353, 354) 1% 4% 85% 13% 2%
Rubber (355) 1% 1% 35% 46% 19%
Plastic (356) 2% 2% 9% 61% 29%
Pottery and Glass (361, 362, 369) 11% 7% 28% 61% 11%
Iron & Steel (371) 5% 7% 75% 21% 4%
Non-ferrous Metals (372) 2% 2% 51% 38% 10%
Fabricated Metal Products (381) 4% 3% 13% 68% 19%
Machinery, except electrical (382) 12% 9% 39% 52% 9%
Machinery, electrical (383) 7% 10% 25% 40% 35%
Transport (384) 6% 6% 48% 33% 20%
Prof. & Sc. Equipment (385) 1% 1% 30% 37% 33%
Other  (390) 3% 3% 7% 59% 34%
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1997
* Based on firms with Independent Account Systems.
State: State-Owned Enterprises
Collective: Collective-owned and Share-Holding Enterprises
Foreign: Foreign Funded and Enterprises funded by Overseas Chinese 
from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan
Share in Industry
Table 2
China's Production Structure by Industry - 1996Multinational State-owned Import
Region Output Share Share Share
Beijing 1909 22% 56% 8%
Tianjin 2094 24% 28% 4%
Include OPC or SEZ
Liaoning 4975 4% 39% 2%
Hebei 3996 7% 33% 1%
Shandong 8456 5% 27% 1%
Jianszu 11813 10% 18% 1%
Shanghai 5129 29% 29% 8%
Zhejiang 8088 8% 8% 1%
Fujian 2801 27% 7% 4%
Guangdong 9535 27% 0% 8%
Guangxi 1666 7% 36% 1%
Hainan 193 20% 5% 35%
Do not include OPC or SEZ
Heilongjiang 2204 3% 65% 1%
Jilin 1429 6% 58% 5%
Inner Mongolia 782 5% 61% 2%
Shanxi 1754 2% 43% 1%
Henan 4715 4% 32% 1%
Anhui 3156 3% 29% 1%
Hubei 4103 4% 35% 1%
Jiangxi 1291 4% 50% 1%
Hunan 2451 3% 39% 1%
Guizhou 557 3% 64% 2%
Yunnan 1207 3% 64% 4%
Sichuan 4426 3% 37% 1%
Tibet 9 0% 73% 25%
Qinghai 149 1% 83% 1%
Shaanxi 1183 5% 56% 2%
Gansu 825 4% 65% 1%
Ningxia 198 9% 67% 1%
Xinjiang 803 2% 72% 1%
Source: Branstetter and Feenstra (2002)
Notes: 
1. Output is measured in 100 million RMB, where 8 RMB ~ US$ 1
2. Consumption shares estimated as in text, and do not sum to 100% because 
there are collective firms and other minor categories left out.
3. OPC stands for "Open Coastal Cities"
Table 3
China's (apparent) Consumption Structure by Region - 1995Table 4
Data to estimate Technology Differences in China - 1996
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Food 0.76 40.4% 0.14 0.08 0.28
Beverage 0.86 60.5% 0.24 0.08 0.16
Tobacco 2.12 70.0% 0.00 0.19 0.04
Textiles 0.93 28.9% 0.21 0.24 0.59
Apparel & Footwear 0.70 49.5% 0.36 0.15 0.57
Leather 0.86 33.7% 0.33 0.11 0.44
Wood 0.58 19.4% 0.11 0.25 0.69
Furniture 0.71 46.1% 0.19 0.28 0.83
Paper 0.81 21.2% 0.22 0.25 0.35
Printing 0.80 18.5% 0.18 0.28 0.48
Chemicals 0.68 17.6% 0.22 0.14 0.28
Petroleum 0.80 11.2% 0.09 0.52 0.12
Rubber 0.74 21.0% 0.29 0.25 0.26
Plastic 1.08 32.1% 0.23 0.17 0.51
Pottery and Glass 0.92 30.4% 0.22 0.39 0.65
Iron & Steel 0.66 10.0% 0.34 0.69 0.27
Non-ferrous Metals 0.59 8.7% 0.15 0.22 0.42
Fabricated Metal Products 0.83 21.2% 0.19 0.31 0.63
Machinery, except electrical 0.96 17.5% 0.24 0.48 0.51
Machinery, electrical 0.63 22.4% 0.28 0.10 0.30
Transport 0.94 27.0% 0.24 0.16 0.45
Professional & Scientific equipment 0.66 22.3% 0.38 0.15 0.58
Other 0.91 39.4% 0.30 0.19 0.61
Note:
σ i: Claro (2003)
τ 96: Nicita and Olarreaga (2001)
θ 
k
L: Share of labor in value-added in firm type n=s,c,f (Firms with Independent Accounting Systems)